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Professional and Ordinary Morality:
A Reply to Freedman
Mike W. Martin
After rereading Freedman's original essay, I still find my earlier interpretations to be legitimate renderings of the essay. I must apologize, however,
for not supplying
the further exegesis warranted by his astute "Response." I want to use the allotted space for clarifying further the substantive issues over which we differ concerning the relationship between professional and ordinary morality.
The following is a list of a few things that might be meant in
drawing a distinction between professional and ordinary morality. They
constitute only rough sketches of definitions based upon, respectively, de
facto standards, the content of justified principles, the origin of justified
principles, and professional status viewed as an act-permitting condition:
(1) Professional morality consists of the standards endorsed by professionals or professional societies. Ordinary morality is the set of standards
people endorse in their nonprofessional,
private lives. (2) Professional
morality is the set of binding moral obligations to which professionals
ought to be committed because of their special skills, functions, working
milieu, etc. Ordinary morality is the set of valid moral considerations and
morally correct judgments considered in abstraction from the special context of the professions and the specific moral obligations of professionals.
(3) Ordinary morality in some sense 'emanates from' or has its origin (or
justification?) in basic features of the human condition, whereas professional morality derives from the special roles of professionals. (4) Professional morality is a set of valid moral principles which sometimes
requires acts that are immoral for anyone except persons having professional status. Ordinary morality is the set of considerations which would
make the acts immoral in the case of nonprofessional
agents.
We may set aside 1. In my earlier essay I ascribed 2 to Freedman, not
3. In his "Response," Freedman- commits himself to the combination of 3
and 4. Following Freedman's lead, I want to focus on 4. In his words, it
"requires that professional morality call upon us to do acts (or to refrain
from doing acts) whose omission (or performance) would be immoral,
save for the fact of the actor's professional identity." Ordinary morality
consists in what a person "would be obliged to do save for the fact of
belonging to this profession." These are presented in the "Response" as
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stipulative definitions, and not as substantive, argued-for, normative conclusions. They make ordinary and professional morality logically incompatible as a matter of definitional necessity. Using these definitions, it is
plain that there are professional moralities, and there is, in particular, a
morality. For example, because I am not a doctor it is
medical-profession
immoral for me to perform open-heart surgery, but it is permissible for
cardiovascular surgeons to perform them, and this is because of their
particular professional status. Again, as Freedman argued, there are some
acts of maintaining confidentiality which are immoral for nondoctors but
permissible for doctors.
It is crucial to emphasize that these definitions leave open the question as to precisely why having a professional identity makes certain acts
moral which would otherwise be immoral. For being a professional involves a complex of special properties, any one or several of which might
be the morally decisive factor in a given case. Some of these properties
may be grouped into the following categories: (a) ability set: possessing
particular skills and expert knowledge; (b) function set: applying those
skills and that knowledge in the course of performing designated functions within appropriate situations; (c) responsibility set: being charged
with promoting a particular social good, and having special moral responsibilities and obligations based upon both this good and the ways
professional activities impact on moral rights; and (d) authorization set:
being an official member of a profession, where a profession is a social
institution granted unique privileges and legal rights by a society which
desires professional zealousness.
Freedman emphasizes d as the key factor which justifies a professional's individual actions. Granting the possible relevance of d, I would
emphasize instead a through c. (It was primarily a and b which I had in
mind in my earlier essay when I spoke of the "circumstances of medical
practice.") Moreover, I would emphasize a through c in justifying both
individual acts and institutional norms, thus invoking them at both of
Freedman's "two tiers." What is important to keep clear is that this is a
substantive normative issue left open by Freedman's definitions. He
would be begging the question if he simply built into his definitions of
"professional morality" that d is decisive.
With this background, I want to make three comments. First, Freedman's position is still open to the fundamental objection that an appeal
based on social consent and society's desire for
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tions from everyday morality. To use an extreme example, the mere fact
that a society gave a Hitlerian authorization to doctors to fanatically
pursue their dedication to health by conducting inhumane experiments
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on Jews (in order to obtain new medical knowledge) would not suffice to
justify the acts of those doctors. The unreasonableness of this society's
desires and its institutional privilege thwarts the appeal to membership in
the institution as a justification of individual acts. Similarly, authorized
membership in the medical profession cannot by itself justify invoking
the confidentiality privilege, for it needs to be justified in terms of a
through c. And I believe it can be shown to be justified to a greater extent
than can confidentiality in the more purely money-based relationships
involved in Freedman's examples of the accountant and the city engineer.
Second, Freedman's attack on deontological justifications for pledging oneself to professional norms (which I viewed as an attack on deontological justifications of professional norms) turns on equating "contravening ordinary morality" with "doing evil." Freedman maintains this
view in his "Response": "At the point of entry into a privileged profession the aspirant is engaged in a promise to do evil." But using the
definition of "professional morality" given in his "Response," there is no
basis for this claim. The aspirant is not promising to do evil, flat out, but
only promising to do acts which would be immoral, save for the fact he
will have professional identity at the time he performs them. Freedman
says precisely this in his later elaboration of the (apparently contradicting) remark that the aspirant's pledge "is saved from being a promise to
do evil." Since it is not really a promise to do evil, his earlier attack on
deontological perspectives is vitiated. Trying to avoid this objection by
inventing special senses of "evil," defined in terms of different moralities,
is needlessly obfuscating. And the same can be said of his statement that
what the aspirant is doing "is exchanging a moral point of view for
another legitimate moral world." This heady talk, reminiscent of
Nietzsche's leap beyond good and evil, is a misleading way of saying that
the special features of the professional world are morally relevant in assessing a person's obligations.
Finally, the importance of pursuing the appeal to rights, understood
in deontological rather than utilitarian terms, seems to me all the more
pressing given Freedman's concluding remarks in the "Response." He
avers that the patient's right to privacy, and hence to confidentiality, is
"created through a grant to the profession of privilege." There are
grounds for concern here! The individual patient is placed in double
jeopardy when his or her rights are treated as contingent upon a privilege
granted by one social unit (a country) to another social unit (a profession).
The moral right to privacy is not the offspring of a legal or institutional
right; rather, the legal or institutional right should be established in order
to insure protection of the moral right.
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